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A B S T R A C T
Diaspora policies have recently become prominent for an increasing number of states. While the growing body of
literature on new diaspora policies and institutions has shown these as a sign of a state's willingness to include
populations from abroad into the polity, an equally new adjacent literature has emphasised the exclusive and
controlling aspect of extra-territorial power of authoritarian states. This article argues that a consideration of co-
occurrence of positive and negative diaspora politics is needed for a holistic understanding of state-led trans-
nationalism and its contested relationship to national territory and popular sovereignty. In this article, we build
on the example of Turkish policies, which on the one hand took considerable steps to include its citizens abroad
and on the other continued the exclusion of the ‘enemies of the state’ and re-defined the limits of political
membership at home and abroad. By analysing the new diasporic institutional practices, the enfranchisement of
external citizens and the right to exit along with loss of citizenship provisions, we show that Turkish state policy
disrupts the assumed holy trinity of nation-state-territory forging a de-territorialised unity between internal and
external citizens, as well as a de-territorialised division along the lines of party loyalty. Looking at diasporic
engagements in all three dimensions - institutional, political and legal-through the lens of citizenship, we de-
monstrate that they are neither the extension of a heavy handed extra-territorial state power nor of an all-
inclusive diaspora policy but a more complex combination of the two.
1. Introduction
Research on states' engagement with non-resident citizens has long
lagged behind, mainly due to the persistence of identifying interna-
tional migration in terms of immigration rather than emigration
(Collyer, 2014, p. 72). While transnationalism scholars have well
documented migrants' activities connecting, navigating and spanning
different territorial entities since the late 1990s (Glick Schiller, Basch, &
Szanton Blanc, 1995; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007), the interest in actions
and policies of countries of origin, so called-sending states, has only
risen in the last decade. The flourishing literature has sought to cata-
logue different diaspora policies and explain the ‘sudden’ increase in
states' involvement. For the most part, this scholarship casts state-dia-
spora relations through a positive lens, reading it as a sign to develop
and/or maintain links with populations abroad albeit in different ways
and at varying degrees (Abramson, 2017; Gamlen, Cummings, Vaaler, &
Rossouw, 2013; Gamlen, 2014b; Collyer & Vathi, 2007; Lafleur, 2011;
Palop-Garcia and Pedroza 2017). On the other hand, an adjacent lit-
erature on the extra-territorial authoritarian state power (Brand, 2006,
2010; Dalmasso et al., 2017; Glasius, 2017) calls to shift the gaze ‘from
the west out’ (Dalmasso et al., 2017, p. 1) and to consider the negative
side of the same coin, focusing on a variety of mechanisms to extend
extraterritorial repression and the ways in which even the mimicking of
democratic instruments such as expansion of voting rights bolster
control.
Building on these two highly related literature, and using Turkish
state's policy as a case study, we make a twofold analytical argument.
First, we suggest that positive-only and negative-only diasporic en-
gagements can explain the story only partially. State-led transnational
activities (of authoritarian regimes) may evolve and institutionalise in
some respects in line with the global trends of positive diaspora en-
gagement, i.e. extending voting rights to citizens abroad, however they
are always embedded in the larger process of transnationalisation of a
citizenship regime. Simultaneously, states may engage with their
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.01.004
Received 11 March 2018; Received in revised form 19 December 2018; Accepted 8 January 2019
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: yanasmayan@eth.mpg.de (Z. Yanasmayan), kasli@essb.eur.nl (Z. Kaşlı).
Political Geography 70 (2019) 24–33
0962-6298/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T
citizens abroad in a negative sense which, for example in the current
Turkish political climate, is proven by the purge against political op-
position that extends well beyond the national borders. However,
marking those as extra-territorial authoritarian state practices and ac-
cepting the authoritarian nature of the regime as a blanket explanation
also offers an incomplete picture as it disregards the co-occurrence of
positive engagement practices of the same states. Turkey's recent dia-
spora governance practices clearly illustrate that state-led diasporic
politics may be not black or white but rather a composition of both
positive and negative engagements with its populations abroad, ranging
from voting rights for all to loss of right to mobility and citizenship for
some. As a remedy to partial explanations offered in meticulous studies
of positive-only and negative-only diasporic engagements, we suggest
looking at this through the citizenship lens, which not only transcends
the home-diaspora divide but also helps circumvent the groupism that
often surrounds the term diaspora. Following the recent scholarship, we
perceive diaspora as a claim for engagement between homeland and
current or ex-citizens abroad rather than an entity with clearly defined
boundaries of membership (Abramson, 2017; Brubaker, 2005;
Mavroudi, 2007). Therefore, we only use the term diasporic for such
claims, particularly made by the Turkish state. While some scholars
stress that diasporising states' measures apply equally to all members
that hold this status (Ragazzi, 2014), others draw attention to the dis-
cretionary power of states in recognising representativeness of certain
actors and distributing resources (Smith, 2003). We agree with the
latter approach, which lead us to our second argument.
Second, we show how state-led transnationalism, in the form of both
negative and positive diaspora engagement, carries important im-
plications for our understanding of political membership, namely citi-
zenship, and popular sovereignty, an aspect that is often shadowed.
While citizenship scholars have duly noted the challenges to the na-
tional citizenship posed by the movement of people across national
borders at different levels, i.e. urban (Holston & Appadurai, 1999),
global (Held, 1995), cosmopolitan (Linklater, 1998) or postnational
(Soysal, 1994), and the increasing trend of dual citizenship that jeo-
pardises the ‘neat trinity of state territory, state authority, and the
people’ (Faist, 2007, p. 3), a relatively stable distinction between in-
ternal and external citizens determined by one's territorial position vis-
à-vis the country of origin (Bauböck, 2009) has been maintained in
diaspora studies. However, we show here that contemporary practices
of not only ‘transmigrants’ (Glick Schiller et al., 1995:48), but also a
state's diasporic policies, call into question territoriality as the defining
character of the internal-external citizenship distinction. Here we build
on Brand's work (2006, 2010, 2014) on the diaspora engagement of
MENA countries, that shows the inextricably linked nature of citizen-
ship struggles at home and abroad, which posit states' diaspora en-
gagements as part and parcel of re-configuration of political member-
ship beyond the outside-inside dichotomy. Relatedly, we join Collyer
(2014) in his observation that extra-territorial performance of rights of
“the people,” as for instance manifested in the growing trend of allo-
cating special representation for external citizens in the home states'
parliaments, shifts the sources of legitimacy from territorial state so-
vereignty to a sort of popular sovereignty that goes beyond the defined
territory of the state.
However, the Turkish example works as a litmus test particularly for
Collyer’s (2014) inquiry as it points at the possible political limits of the
notion of popular sovereignty. While the Turkish ruling elite embraces a
rhetoric of “popular sovereignty” that goes beyond the state's territorial
borders, it does so by overtly equating popular sovereignty with poli-
tical loyalty to the incumbent government, embodied in the persona of
the president. Moreover, the loyal (transnational) Turkish citizens fully
enjoy citizenship rights, from voting from afar, to working, investing,
travelling in and out of the country freely whereas political dissidents at
home and abroad are deprived of, among others, their right to mobility,
which forcefully territorialises them. The political and bureaucratic
authorities' perception of political opposition as an “existential threat”
has been a source of justification for suspension of legal protections and
citizenship rights during the two year-long state of emergency (July
2016–July 2018) and will certainly continue with the institutionalisa-
tion of the ‘exceptional’ rule-making under the new presidential system
that led to an over-concentration of power at the hands of the president
without checks and balances. Even though this is clearly related to the
deepening authoritarianism in Turkey, the state of exception is an in-
trinsic character of the modern sovereign powers and, in Agamben's
terms, these powers “claim[s] to maintain law in its very suspension”
(2005:59). This is well proven by the recent measures introduced
against ‘the war on terror’ in Western states that again make use of the
toolkit of legal dimension of citizenship such as deprivation and con-
fiscation of passports (see Joppke, 2016; Kapoor & Narkowicz, 2018;
Skyes 2016). Therefore, we argue that, we need a rather holistic look at
institutional, political and legal relations between home states and their
external citizens, in order to empirically capture the limits of extra-
territorialising citizenship rights, political membership and popular
sovereignty.
Our analysis of the Turkish case is based on various forms of data we
collected. First, following Fairclough’s (2010) approach to discourse as
a set of social relations between entities, we did a critical discourse
analysis of all issues of Arti90, the three-monthly journal of the Turkish
diasporic institution. We studied all sixteen issues published online
between January 2012 and December 2016, with due attention to the
timing of the topics covered, their salience and position in the journal,
as well as the content of those texts closely related to the citizenship
rights of citizens abroad. Secondly, we conducted a policy analysis, by
collecting parliamentary reports, decrees, laws and regulations per-
taining to the rights of external citizens in general and right to exit and
enfranchisement in particular. Finally, we compiled official election
results abroad since 2007, the first time when citizens abroad could
vote, and, based on a comparative analysis of election results at home
and abroad, examined the election results in relation to Turkey's dia-
sporic politics.
In the remainder of this paper, we first unpack the recent studies
tackling the emergence of diasporic politics and explain the variations
and common patterns. Based on the Turkish case, we show why these
innovative contributions do not sufficiently capture the complexity of
current diasporic politics on the ground. It is our contention that joining
forces with a citizenship lens will enrich the toolkit of diaspora studies
and help us easily decipher the ways in which seemingly contradictory
state practices co-exist at the institutional, political and legal dimen-
sions. To prove our point, we move on to the Turkish case and explore
these three dimensions on its own right: the rise of new diasporic in-
stitutions, the enfranchisement of external citizenry and the regulations
of loss of citizenship and right to exit. Finally, we stress that further
studies on diasporic politics must include the span of the co-occurrence
of negative and positive diaspora engagement and situate these within
the larger processes of de-territorialisation of citizenship, expansion of
political membership and shifting popular sovereignty at home and
abroad.
2. Diasporic engagements, external citizenship and limits of
membership in authoritarian regimes
The fact that countries with different size, economic development
and political system have recently begun to develop diaspora policies,
which Gamlen (2014b) rightfully calls a global trend, has urged scho-
lars to study state-external citizen relations. Whereas economic (re-
mittances) and political (lobbying) interests maintain significant roles
(Bauböck, 2003) in states' diaspora engagement, several other factors
are underlined, ranging from the impact of emigrant lobbying (Brand,
2006, 2014; Escobar, 2006), to the evolution of domestic politics
(Lafleur, 2011), and to the diffusion of norms (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015)
and institutions (Delano, 2014; Gamlen, 2014b; Gamlen et al., 2013).
Moreover, while some scholars have put more emphasis on the issue of
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external voting in an insular way (Collyer & Vathi, 2007; Lafleur, 2011;
Palop-Garcia and Pedroza 2017; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015), others have
perceived this as part of the general phenomena of the ‘rise’ of diaspora
engagement of sending states (Brand, 2006; Collyer, 2014; Delano,
2014; Delano & Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2014a; Pedroza & Palop-
Garcia, 2017; Ragazzi, 2014) or given more attention to the spread of
new diaspora institutions and homeland practices (Abramson, 2017;
Gamlen, 2014b; Öktem, 2014). Therefore, the scope of these studies has
focused first and foremost on the new diaspora institutions and external
voting rights while they and paid little attention to the implications of
diaspora policies for citizenship practices at home and abroad.
External citizenship is distinguished from internal citizenship as “a
generic concept that refers to the status, rights and duties of all those
who are temporarily or permanently outside the territory of a polity
that recognises them as members.” (Bauböck, 2009, p. 478). The very
act of mobility across territorial borders of a political community makes
one an external citizen, and therefore categorically speaking distin-
guishes external from the internal citizens. An important part of this
distinction lies in the right to exit, return, or in short, the right to
mobility. Even though international covenants recognize the right to
exit irrespective of one's citizenship status (ICCPR Article 12 paragraph
2), this right is neither absolute nor is it uniformly applied in the
practice of nation states. There are several examples when states have
heavily regulated the right to exit, making it dependent on substantial
screening and therefore a significant tool for controlling their popula-
tions (i.e. Shapiro, 2016 for South Africa, Rozin 2011 for Israel, and in
general Brand, 2006, 2010, 2014).
While this categorical distinction between internal and external ci-
tizens seems intrinsic to the field of diaspora studies and its exclusive
focus on non-resident citizens, certain citizenship rights, and particu-
larly the right to mobility as the primary condition to become an ex-
ternal citizen and conditions for maintaining or loss of citizenship, are
marginally included in the most comprehensive models (e.g. Palop-
Garcia and Pedroza 2017; Pedroza & Palop-Garcia, 2017; Ragazzi,
2014). Holding that “the global trend is in the opposite direction”
(Ragazzi, 2014, p. 76), they treat it as ‘a thing of the past’. In that sense,
there is an emphasis on the institutional and political dimension of
state-external citizen relations whereas the legal dimension pertaining
to maintaining formal citizenship ties has been overlooked.
This comes particularly to light when one scrutinizes the diasporic
policies of authoritarian or hybrid states such as Turkey where dia-
sporic engagement is not necessarily positive and positive only.
Evidently, this omission has to do with the level of analysis. These
studies have taken on the ambitious task of offering comparative clas-
sifications (Ragazzi, 2014), index of policies (e.g. EMIX by Palop Garcia
and Pedroza 2017) and gradations of political inclusion on the basis of
electoral rights offered (Palop Garcia and Pedroza 2017). For instance,
Ragazzi (2014) develops five typologies of states: the expatriate state
that focuses on cultural and educational policies, the closed state that
heavily regulates and restricts the mobility of its citizens and does not
allow external voting, the global-nation state that represents the
broader number of policies and grants most rights, the managed labour
state that provides investment schemes, and the indifferent state, which
does not really engage with its diaspora in any respect. According to
these classifications, Turkey qualifies to be at the inclusive end of the
spectrum, namely as a case of “full inclusion” in Palop-Garcia and
Pedroza's (2017) model and as a “global-nation” in Ragazzi’s (2014)
(see also Sahin-Mencütek & Baser, 2018). However, our analysis shows
that Turkey is a case of full inclusion and a global-nation, only to the
external citizens aligned to ruling party ideology and not to those who
are critical of it. Hence a case like Turkey points at a puzzle that the
existing models of diasporic states cannot yet fully grasp.
This puzzle seems to be picked up by contributors of an adjacent
literature focusing entirely on the diaspora engagement of authoritarian
states and underlining much more explicitly the negative side of the
story. While Collyer and King (2015) show how states through direct,
symbolic and imaginative mechanisms seek to extend their control
beyond national territories, in their recent intervention in this journal,
Dalmasso et al. (2017) claim that inclusion of non-resident citizens in
authoritarian regimes can never be understood in the same way as in a
democratic setting, as it is always “precarious, conditional both on the
exile's good behavior and on the ‘whim of the regime’” (Dalmasso et al.,
2017, p. 2). They observe a clear difference between authoritarian
governance at home and beyond borders and demonstrate the ways in
which authoritarian states maintain and develop submissive ties with
their populations abroad and, by means of them, gain extraterritorial
state power. For example, unlike traditional ways of controlling popu-
lations, such as imprisonment and censorship, Moss and Michaelsen's
(2017) notes on Syria and Iran show how the state can exert control
over its external citizens through subjecting the close relatives of critics
abroad to (the threat of) arrest, harassment or torture. Moreover, they
also question the validity of citizenship as an analytical lens with which
to understand the engagement of authoritarian regimes with its ‘po-
pulations abroad.’ In a follow-up article, Glasius (2017:2) argues that
instead of treating them as citizens, “the authoritarian state approaches
its populations abroad, and includes or excludes them, as subjects to be
repressed and extorted, as clients to be co-opted, or as patriots to be
discursively manipulated.”
These recent contributions have the important function of dis-
playing negative engagements, particularly for authoritarian and/or
hybrid cases such as Turkey, a regime that is notoriously drifting to
authoritarianism (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016).
Yet we contend that they fall in to the same fallacy as general diaspora
engagement studies as they fail to see that authoritarian states' actions
are simultaneously and selectively inclusive and exclusive. This com-
plexity is revealed only when we look closely at what happens to the
citizenship regime as a whole – at its institutional, political and legal
dimensions and particularly to the right to mobility, a precondition for
diasporic ties with the home state. Even though we agree with
Dalmasso et al. (2017:1) that authoritarian states are not “giant prison
camps, locking their populations in” and that they have several other
tools at hand to extend their extraterritorial power, as also theorised by
Collyer and King (2015), the Turkish example shows that not only that
some citizens get ‘locked in’ the territory with very marginalising effects
on their lives but also that leaving might mean a complete loss of
membership while others, despite being non-resident, enjoy their citi-
zenship rights to the full extent.
Looking at diasporic engagement practices of authoritarian states
with a citizenship lens that pays due attention to the seemingly con-
tradictory institutional, political and legal relations between home
states and their external citizens, would not only allow for detecting co-
occurrence of negative and positive engagements of states but also the
dynamic demarcation lines through which states are selectively ex-
clusive and inclusive in the definition of the limits of their membership
towards their populations abroad and at home. Here Brand’s (2006,
2010, 2014) studies on authoritarian and in-transition regimes' en-
gagement with their citizens abroad, offer us a good entry point. In her
book that analyzes the diaspora institutions of four MENA countries
(Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan), Brand (2006) establishes a
strong relationship between a state's diasporic engagement and sover-
eignty and captures the broader implications for the limits of political
membership. While in her 2010 study that focuses on the extension of
extra-territorial voting rights, Brand is critical of perceiving such see-
mingly democratizing moves as expansion of citizenship rights - despite
the adoption of citizenship language - following the Arab uprisings, she
(2014) contends that the depth of the transition at home will circum-
scribe the re-drawing of citizenship regimes through extension of voting
rights. Importantly, Brand (2006, 2010, 2014) consistently demon-
strates that states' treatment of its populations abroad should be un-
derstood as part and parcel of not only negotiations over new forms of
political membership but also of prevailing citizenship struggles at
home. While Brand therefore takes the citizenship regimes as
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interconnected at home and abroad, her analysis presumes that these
regimes are either positive or negative for all, which we show is not
always the case.
Last but not least, we argue that our analytical framework reveals
the limits of the relationship between expansion of extra-territorial
political membership and popular sovereignty. Based on a global survey
of electoral systems, Collyer (2014:67) inquires the implications of in-
troduction of external voting on the relationship between democracy,
sovereignty and nation, and argues that extending political membership
to non-resident citizens may not lead to drastic changes in territorial
sovereignty of neither sending nor host states. Yet they usher in a new
relationship of political authority to territory as the political authority
begins to gain legitimacy through popular sovereignty which, with
external voting rights, has expanded beyond territorial borders of na-
tion-states and gained symbolic significance. In Collyer's words
(2014:71) “The symbolic source of their sovereignty is thereby partially
displaced from control over territory to the legitimacy they derive from
representing the nation.”
Our analytical framework builds on Collyer's take on the symbolic
significance of enfranchisement for the legitimacy of the state authority
and the ensuing disarticulation between nation and state in territorial
terms. Yet, we contend that when we consider states' diasporic en-
gagement in the institutional and political dimensions, together with
the transformations in the citizenship laws, namely the legal dimension,
we may observe an even narrower definition of ‘the people’ in and by
whom the legitimacy of the political authority is founded. The Turkish
example clearly shows us that while the ruling party needs and gains
consent of (enough) voters both at home and abroad for legitimacy, the
political membership of both internal and external citizens remains
conditional upon their act of support for the ruling party that legit-
imises its power through elections, regardless of their unfair nature,
which qualifies it as a competitive authoritarian state (see Esen &
Gümüşçü, 2016 on this). This is evident in the way the extra-territorial
performance of popular sovereignty is balanced out with the curtail-
ment of another pillar of citizenship, namely the right to mobility, of
political dissidents who do not give consent to the ruling party.
What also emerges as significant in the Turkish case is the amal-
gamation of the ruling party and state as an actor that does not neatly
fit in to the distinction developed in the literature between state and
party outreach to populations abroad (Burgess, 2018; Koinova, 2018;
Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei, forthcoming). While Turkey could be
considered a typical case of state outreach, according to Burgess (2018),
that is characterised by official state agencies and weak in-
stitutionalisation of political parties abroad, the outcomes of diaspora
engagement are in line with what is expected from party outreach, that
is, high turnout in elections as well as “export of dysfunctional parti-
sanship to transnational spaces” (Burgess, 2018, p. 374). Therefore,
since in the Turkish case the ruling party AKP has ‘conquered’ the state
(Somer, 2017), the state-led outreach then easily controls and uses all
the institutional, political and legal tools in its vicinity to shape what
appears as an expansion of “popular sovereignty” beyond territorial
borders by fully including AKP supporters and partially excluding dis-
sidents in terms of their enjoyment of citizenship rights.
Hence, we argue for a holistic citizenship lens that gives less weight
on the territorial distinction between internal and external citizens by
embedding a state's diasporic engagement within its citizenship regime
and that considers extra-territorial state power as a manifestation of
state-citizen relations at institutional, political and legal dimensions.
3. Turkish state’s engagement with external citizens
Turkish diasporic politics have evolved and taken conflicting turns
over the course of the diasporisation process, which, as Abramson
(2017) shows in the case of Israel, entails the creation of an embodied
and emotional homeland. The state-led transnationalism and political
ties between diasporic communities with the Turkish homeland have
received widespread scholarly attention (e.g. Aksel, 2014; Aydin, 2014;
Mügge, 2012; Okyay, 2015; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Sahin-Mencütek
& Baser, 2018; Sahin-Mencütek & Erdogan, 2015; Öktem, 2014). This
growing body of literature builds on the broader trends in diaspora
literature, namely the establishment of the new diaspora institutions
and the enfranchisement of external citizens through facilities of voting
in the countries of residence. This scholarship has also been critical in
displaying the selectively exclusive character of the current diaspora
policy of the AKP when it comes to some diasporic communities,
namely Kurdish, Alevi or Assyrian migrants (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen,
2003; Sahin-Mencütek & Baser, 2018). However, implications of the co-
occurrence of inclusive and exclusive policies for political membership
in Turkey have so far not been examined. Nor have the parallels be-
tween this kind of exclusion towards some citizens abroad and the in-
creasing chasm between Turkish state and different citizen groups at
home.
3.1. Diasporic institutions: from limited to selective inclusion
Unlike earlier decades, Turkey's engagement with citizens abroad
has become of paramount importance concomitant with the shift to-
wards a proactive foreign policy in the late 1990s and 2000s (Aydin,
2014; Öktem, 2014). While the initial engagements were a response to
the pressing needs of the emigrant communities and national and re-
ligious education of the children of emigrants which were serious
concerns for almost all governments (Okyay, 2015), the new diasporic
institutions of the 2000s are designed to construct a diasporic identity
strongly tied with an imagined Turkish homeland.
Before the first official diaspora agency, the Turkish state estab-
lished ties with emigrants through a network of mosques linked with
Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) founded in several
European states. This was also meant as a counter response to the
Islamic and anti-Kemalist movements, which were suppressed in
Turkey yet freely active in Europe, following the 1980 coup (see Senay,
2012 for ‘trans-Kemalism’, the secularist founding principles of republic
and its related diaspora policies). Through the Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA), founded in 1991, and ‘Coordination
Councils’, established within diplomatic representations in 1986–1987,
regular and formal diasporic relations were developed and later carried
on to the Consultation Commission for Citizens Living Abroad (Yurt-
dışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu, YYVDK), founded in
1998. Members of these commissions were appointed by the govern-
ment from among the “approved expatriate organisations database of
the Ministry of Interior” with the goal to unite the expatriate force
against host-country political actors' manoeuvres that contested Tur-
key's officially held stances in issues such as Armenian genocide, PKK or
Cyprus Conflict (Okyay, 2015; Østergaard- Nielsen 2003).
The official diaspora discourse of the AKP rule in early 2000s was
interpreted as more inclusive than the previous decades (Aydin, 2014;
Okyay, 2015; Öktem, 2014). The diaspora-related state institutions
have diversified and expanded their focus, scope and budget with the
establishment of Presidency of Expatriate Turks and Related Commu-
nities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, henceforth
YTB) as the flagship agency of Turkey's new diaspora policy in 2010.
The agency is focused mainly on three groups; labour migrant com-
munities and their descendants living abroad, kin or related commu-
nities in the Balkans and Central Asia, and foreign, often Muslim stu-
dents on YTB scholarship who are expected to build ties with Turkey
and develop them further after returning to their countries of origin.
YTB's three-monthly journal titled Arti90 (Plus 90, referring to
Turkey's international telephone code)1 represents the “very wide range
of diaspora communities”, and as Öktem (2014:14) aptly puts, “the
1While the journal has widely circulated both in hardcopy and online, there
are no statistical data available on the scope of journal's readership.
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challenges to an operationalisation of diaspora policies.” Indeed, a close
reading of the journal's all 16 issues published between 2012 and 2016
reveals that the motivations and goals of the agency are explained in
every editorial with an emphasis on the strength of “new Turkey.” This
populist rhetoric is developed and widely used by the AKP during
election campaigns of 2010s to refer to its rule as “the golden era of
single-party governments, stability, inclusion, and advanced democ-
racy” (Selcuk, 2016, p. 577). Evidently, this reference to “new Turkey”
that external citizens can rely upon is not coincidental nor is the cover
of the 5th issue with a picture of Erdogan waving hand in the back-
ground of European country flags and with the caption that says “You
are never and ever alone!: YTB's story of foundation” (Issue 5, 2013).2
Although the life stories of students, covered in each issue, are from all
over the world, each issue has a special theme generally related to the
emigrants in Europe, namely discrimination and racism in Western
Europe, assimilation and adoption of immigrant children in Europe. In
that sense, it shows continuity with diasporic politics of earlier decades
that selectively defined and addressed the needs of diasporic commu-
nities.
Despite its initial discursive claims for diversity and inclusiveness,
once one traces them over time, YTB's activities in general reveal
continuity with past practices of selective engagement with certain
segments of external citizens who form AKP's electoral base abroad.
Take, for example, the Turkish - Co-ethnic and Kin Communities
Meeting (Türk - Soydaş ve Akraba Toplulukları Buluşması) that was
held in Istanbul in February 2010. Among the 2500 representatives that
participated in the meeting, those who were given voice were ex-
patriates in Europe and the US, co-ethnics and/or fellow Muslims and
co-ethnic immigrant associations, whereas Kurdish and Alevi associa-
tions abroad were not contacted or invited on this or other occasions
(Okyay, 2015). Another example of continuity is the revival of the
YYVDK of 1990s under YTB's roof in 2012 as the “Consultation Com-
mission of Citizens Abroad” (Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu,
YVDK). Just as its predecessor, the YVDK was again formed by ap-
pointment, this time by AKP government, and clearly reflected an
ethno-religious bias as the members were businesspeople and re-
presentatives from civil society organisations mainly working on issues
related to Islam and Turkish-language teaching in their countries of
residence (for the full list of members, see Arti90, Issue 5). The inclusion
of representatives from organisations driven with the bond of Muslim
brotherhood, such as the IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş)
and overseas MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's
Association), illustrates a reversal of the official secularist selection bias
of the 1990s ‘trans-Kemalism’ (Senay, 2012). Yet it also reproduces the
exclusionary logic of favouring like-minded agents.
In the last years, rising polarisation in domestic politics certainly has
widened the gap between different diasporic communities and the
Turkish state. Gezi Park protests during May–June 2013 sparked a
nation-wide uprising and were carried forward with street protests and
neighbourhood forums in many cities of Turkey against rising author-
itarianism. It also found resonance among Turkish citizens abroad.
Formerly distinct diasporic groups and individuals with different
ideological backgrounds came together first time in sit-ins and de-
monstrations that were organised in many capitals around the world
and have mobilised in social media to show solidarity with the pro-
testors in Turkey (Baser, 2015; Giglou, Ogan, & d’Haenens, 2018). The
politicisation and polarisation among external, as well as internal citi-
zens, got a new twist as of December 2013 with the de facto end of the
close alliance between AKP and the transnational Gülen movement,
that is the Islamist political and social movement active all over the
world for more than two decades now, and was one of the main
political and economic support base of the AKP (see Tas, 2017 for more
on this). None of these political contestations were mentioned in YTB's
journal Arti90 which at that time continued to cover only positive ties
between the Turkish state and the ‘diaspora’ and focus only on the
crucial function that YTB accomplishes in generating one cohesive
Turkish diasporic identity, devoid of internal conflicts.
The domestic-diasporic politics divide seems to be put aside with
the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt which marked new heights in the
way Turkish state sees its citizens abroad as friends or enemies of the
state. Arti90's last two issues, which came out in the immediate after-
math of July 2016, made bold criticisms towards European govern-
ments for their unwillingness to cooperate with Turkish government in
their “fight against FETO” (short for ‘terrorist organisation’ of Fethullah
Gülen, the leader of Gülen movement) and called the ‘diaspora’ to raise
their voices to unmask the real face of Gülen movement in their
countries of residence. This proved how the new diasporic institution,
YTB, was instrumentally used for the government's positive yet selec-
tive engagement attempts with external citizens when the need arises to
form a public opinion abroad in line with Turkey's (read AKP's) official
discourse.
Despite these initial reactions and attempts to mobilise external
citizens, no new issue of Arti90 came out in 2017. This is perhaps a
residue of the two year-long state of emergency that lasted until July
2018, and the recent political stagnation in Turkey which brought
many media outlets, government-led or otherwise, to be put on hold.
The same goes for the activities of YTB's consultation commission YVDK
which is no longer active.3 This excitement of the early 2010s and the
current suspension reveals that state-external citizen relations cannot
be conceptualised without consideration of the political frictions and
state-citizen relations at home.
In sum, the new diasporic institutions developed during the AKP
period stand in stark contrast to the weak ties of the earlier decades in
institutional terms. However, along with previous studies' findings on
Turkey's state-led transnationalism, the evolution of the YTB's narrative
reveals that the strong ties that these new institutionalized practices
aimed to cultivate were at best selectively inclusive and reproduced a
bias similar to the initial attempts of the 1990s nationalist governments.
They also contributed to a discursive shift towards popular sovereignty
with a new Turkish state under the leadership of Erdogan that protects
resident and non-resident citizens alike. All in all, Turkey's diaspora
policies in 2010s follow the global trend of expanding diaspora gov-
ernance, yet just moved the bar from limited to selective inclusion in
institutional terms. These positive institutional engagements do not fit
squarely in the inclusive camp, identified in Palop Garcia and Pedroza's
(2017) and Ragazzi's (2014) studies, and are closer to Dalmasso et al.’s
(2017) point that they are conditional upon the good behavior of the
external citizens. While the next section shows that the political arena
opens up to all external citizens albeit the selective inclusion in in-
stitutional engagements, the last section on legal dimension again
swings the pendulum of inclusion to the condition of good behavior.
3.2. Enfranchisement of external citizens: political inclusion of all at the
ballot box
The recent changes in the procedures to vote abroad has the effect of
expanding legitimate basis for popular sovereignty from “inside-out,” in
2 While its' first issue was published in January 2012, it seems to come to a
halt after its 16th issue published at the end of 2016 in the aftermath of the
failed coup attempt.
3 In the editorial of the last issue, it is noted that “the main agenda of the
[seemingly the last publically announced YVDK] meeting was “fight against
FETO and action plan.” While problems related to language, culture, family and
social life, racism and xenophobia were gathered during the meeting, it was
also decided that a “Diaspora Strategy Act” would be submitted within the
coming six months to YVDK by the working groups composed of related public
institutions, universities and NGOs, (Editorial, Issue 16, 2016). While its first
appointed members' term of office ended at the end of 2016, at the moment
even the link to its website is not active. (accessed 07.03.2018).
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Collyer's (2014) terms, allowing inclusion of all at the ballot box.
However, this led to a mere reflection of increasingly polarizing politics
of the AKP in the external citizens' voting preferences and extra-terri-
torial political participation, which is shaped along the lines of loyalty/
dissident to the existing political regime.
Until 2012, the enfranchisement of citizens abroad was not ex-
plicitly regulated, therefore suffering from the enactment and regula-
tion gap pointed out by Palop-Garcia and Pedroza (2017). The right of
voting at the polling stations at the borders was first introduced in 1987
but did not receive constitutional legitimacy until the 1995 amendment
of the Art. 67 of the constitution. The 1995–2008 period is char-
acterised by inertia with no further steps to mobilise external citizens
aside from providing polling stations at the customs. What's more, the
possibility to vote only at the Turkish customs resulted in the practice of
this political right only when external citizens travelled to Turkey,
hence, even if temporarily, were within the territorial borders and
jurisdiction of the Turkish state. The 2008 amendment to the Law on
Elections and Electoral Registers (Art. 94/A) radically changed this and
introduced three other methods of voting besides the ballots at the
Turkish customs: by regular mail, at the representations abroad and
electronically. A final amendment in 2012 to the Law on Elections and
Electoral Registers regulated the practical aspects of overseas voting
procedures. This moved Turkey in the direction of a “full inclusion”
country, again following Palop-Garcia and Pedroza (2017).
The first elections to be organised in the overseas representations
were the August 2014 presidential elections which was also the first
presidential election in Turkey's political history. This was then fol-
lowed by the June 2015 parliamentary and November 2015 snap
elections, the April 2017 constitutional referendum as well as the most
recent June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore,
after its authorisation, the voting rights of external citizens have been
put to test very frequently. The increasing turnout and results of the
elections abroad reveal not only a blurriness of the distinction between
internal and external citizens in terms of their political participation but
also an ongoing process of extra-territorialisation of the political divi-
sions along party lines (Table 1).
Despite having a low start with the 2014 presidential elections, the
turnout rate abroad consistently increased in every election reaching
50%. The rise in absolute numbers is also nothing short of impressive.
The twelfth issue of Arti90 in 2015 shows that since its first introduction
in 1987 when some 47,000 went to the polls at the customs, the number
rose almost thirty times in 2017 reaching almost 1.3 million voters
(Issue 12, 2015). Therefore, it seems that the political engagement with
external citizens through enfranchisement, resonated well with a sig-
nificant portion of the diasporic communities.
Clearly, some institutional interventions in the implementation of
the election law have assisted in the rise of turnout (e.g. facilitation of
voting and registration procedures, extension of time period of elections
and, since 2017 public referendum, the possibility to vote in any con-
sulate). However, most important of all is the increasing electoral
mobilisation through state and party channels. This is where the
inclusion pendulum which came close to full inclusion on the political
dimension - with the right to vote for all - made a swing back to se-
lective inclusion due to these institutional interventions that favoured
pro-AKP electorate abroad.
YTB, as the official diasporic institution, engaged in mobilising its
audience. For instance, the ninth issue of Arti90, which was published
in July 2014, was dominated by the topic of presidential elections, the
tenth issue of Arti90 came out in June 2015 with the title “Are you up
for Turkey? 28 million voters will go to the ballots in 54 countries”
(Issue 10, 2015). The following issues of Arti90 were also actively used
as a milieu to communicate the procedures for voting abroad, ex-
plaining in detail the efforts of YTB personnel in reaching out to voters
to increase the turn outs and give the results from the ballots abroad
and at the customs (Issue 11, 2015 and Issue 12, 2015). Moreover,
Arti90 was not always neutral in its extensive coverage of voting rights
of the external citizens, as a state medium would be expected to be.
Upcoming elections were in the headlines in four out of sixteen issues
and the right to vote was mentioned as one of the longstanding wishes
of the external citizens and a necessary step for the excellence of
Turkish democracy in almost every issue, either at the introductory
pieces penned by the editor and the head of the YTB or by the political
figure interviewed for each journal issue. Nonetheless, the then prime
minister Erdoğan's role was highlighted and his personal initiative for
the establishment of YTB which “ended the 50 years of negligence to-
wards our citizens” was underlined every time the 2012-dated
amendments to the election law were mentioned. The subtext to the
storyline is that this regulation, which makes voting abroad practically
possible, was realized thanks to the AKP and specifically Erdoğan's
leadership. Therefore, as we have seen on the institutional dimension,
on the political dimension too the limits of membership have been
expanded and a shift towards extra-territorialised popular sovereignty
has been promoted in exchange for gratefulness to the ruling party. A
case in point is the article written by the director of YTB Kudret Bülbül
in the ninth issue of Arti90, right before the 2014 presidential election
at which PM Erdoğan was a candidate:
As mentioned earlier, our citizens living abroad were disregarded
and abandoned for 50 years. To compensate for this mistake, YTB
was founded in 2010 ( …) Our citizens’ ability to vote wherever they
are, their political participation and the attention the presidential
candidates show towards them (also the attention that will be shown in
future elections) are processes that will naturally lift the disregard [of
the past]. (Yurtdışında Yerinde Oy Kullanmanın Anlamı [The
meaning of voting where you are], by Assoc Prof. Kudret Bülbül,
July 2014: 18–19).4
While referring to presidential candidates in the plural could be seen
as an acknowledgement of the existence of other candidates, his further
analysis of possible election results leaves the readership with the
Table 1
Turnout rates in Turkish elections abroad.a
Source: Authors' calculation based on YSK website.
Turnout at the borders Turnout at the representations Total turnout abroad
2007 General Elections 8.88 N/A 8.88
2010 Referendum 7.68 N/A 7.68
2011 General Elections 5.03 N/A 5.03
2014 Presidential Elections 10.6 8.3 18.9
2015 June General Elections 4.34 32.5 36.84
2015 November General Elections 4.78 40.01 44.79
2017 Referendum 3.3 44.6 47.9
2018 June General and Presidential Elections 5.45 44.88 50.33
a All figures presented are percentages.
4 Authors' translation and emphasis.
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impression that there is no alternative for conservative voters, other
than the self-proven leadership of Erdoğan. Aside from utilisation of
YTB, starting with the November 2015 snap elections, AKP did not
abstain from using consulate address databases to send campaigning
material that took credit for the recent diasporic engagements such as
the YTB or decreased flight costs of Turkish Airlines. The leaflet with
AKP logo posted to external citizens’ home addresses before the April
2017 constitutional referendum made an open call for a “yes” vote for a
“stronger Turkey” and an “effective fight against terror,” particularly
“FETO” next to the timetable for shuttle services to the consulates on
election days. With developments as such, not only the ever-thinner line
between party politics and state politics evaporates but also the dia-
sporic relations between the home state-external citizens are cast in
terms of relations with AKP and Erdoğan.
Aside from using official state channels for propaganda, AKP also
relied on non-state actors such as mosque associations and pro-AKP
organisations, such as the Cologne-based Union of European Turkish
Democrats (UETD), the headquarters of which was opened by the then
PM Erdoğan, which has become the interlocutor between the AKP and
its overseas constituency. Opposition parties' representatives, and both
established and new civil society initiatives abroad, which have
emerged in the aftermath of the Gezi uprisings, have also taken part in
political outreach activities such as organizing rallies, campaign trips,
and sending out hand-outs (Abadan-Unat et al., 2014). However, their
presence remained relatively weak, due to the lack of established party
organs, limited resources and partial attitude of state channels, which
created an uneven playing field characteristic of competitive author-
itarian regimes just like at home (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016).
The voting results presented in Table 2 show precisely that: not only
that the polarisation at home found strong resonance among the voters
abroad, but also that such transnational campaigning built on the ex-
isting political mobilisations (see Burgess, 2018, Østergaard-Nielsen &
Ciornei, forthcoming), which gradually attracted the previously disen-
gaged conservative electorate, playing in favour of AKP.
On the political dimension, the enfranchisement of external citi-
zenry resulted in the inclusion of all citizens erasing the distinction
between internal and external citizens in terms of voting rights, how-
ever it simultaneously brought forward a de-territorialised distinction
based on loyalty to homeland party politics. While turn out rates and
mobilisation can be interpreted as positive engagement with homeland
politics and expansion of popular sovereignty beyond territorial bor-
ders, recent changes in citizenship policies, shown in the next section,
hint at a more direct and intentional negative engagement with citizens
abroad on the legal dimension which is an extension of the struggles of
the political opposition at home. Hence the curtailment of the citizen-
ship rights of all opposing views also blurs the internal-external citi-
zenship distinction, yet from the complete opposite angle of the poli-
tical inclusion of all through enfranchisement, that is the total exclusion
of opposition abroad and at home.
3.3. Citizenship policies: legal exclusion of disobedience at home and
abroad
In a strictly legal sense, citizenship is the primary formal tie be-
tween states and populations under their jurisdiction and as explained
earlier, the regulation of citizenship as formal/legal membership and
more specifically the right to mobility touches to the very core of home
state-emigrant relations. The Turkish constitution recognises the right
to leave as a fundamental right and stipulates that citizens shall not be
expelled, nor shall they be banned from entering the country. While in
Table 2
Turkish elections results abroad and at home.a
Source: Authors' calculation based on YSK website.
Presidential Elections
2014 R. Tayyip Erdoğan
AKP's candidate
Eklemeddin Ihsanoğlu
CHP and MHP's candidate
Selahattin Demirtaş
HDP's candidate
Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad
51.65 62.30 38.57 27.92 9.78 9.78
2018 R. Tayyip Erdoğan
AKP and MHP's candidate
Muharrem Ince
CHP's candidate
Selahattin Demirtaş
HDP's candidate
Meral Aksener
IYI Party's candidate
Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad
52.43 59.37 30.76 25.78 8.30 11.04 7.41 2.99
General Electionsb
Political parties/Elections AKP CHP HDP MHP
Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad
June 2015 40.66 50.30 25.13 15.93 12.96 21.43 16.45 9.09
Nov 2015 49.32 56.38 25.56 15.44 10.56 19.17 12.03 7.06
June 2018 41.62 51.89 22.64 16.54 11.48 17.93 10.98 7.86
2017 Referendum
NO vote YES vote
Domestic Abroad Domestic Abroad
48.76 40.54 51.24 59.46
HDP: Peoples' Democratic Party, umbrella party for leftist and Kurdish voters.
CHP: Republican People's Party, the first political party of republican era, loyal to Kemalist founding principles.
MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, right of centre and openly ally with AKP since failed coup attempt.
AKP: Justice and Development Party, right of centre neoliberal alliance, in government since 2002.
IP: Good Party, a new centre right party, split from MHP and formed in October 2017.
a All presented figures are percentages.
b In June 2018, two alliances were formed: 1) AKP and MHP and 2) CHP, IYI Party and SP (religious conservative right). The percentages are calculated on the
basis of party votes, and not alliances.
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principle Turkish law respects every citizens' right to become an ex-
ternal citizen by enjoying their related right to mobility and allows for
the continuation of the citizenship bond with external citizens in
Bauböck’s (2009) terms, it also maintains that right to mobility can be
limited in cases of investigation or prosecution, which need to be de-
termined by judicial bodies (Art. 23).
Since 1981, Turkey also allows dual citizenship for persons who
have informed the authorities about their intention to acquire a second
citizenship (Kadirbeyoglu, 2007). Turkish citizenship law has gradually
taken extensive steps to ensure that its populations abroad legally re-
main as citizens; by not granting renunciation in cases of statelessness
(Art.26), by removing residency criteria for re-acquisition for those who
received a renunciation permit (Art. 13). To maintain its relationship
with external citizens even in the absence of formal citizenship status,
Turkey also introduced in 1995 a so-called ‘blue card’ scheme, which is
a privileged non-citizen status that entitles holders to a number of
substantial rights in Turkey – such as residence, inheritance and prop-
erty – with the exception of voting rights.
Moreover, Turkish state also eliminated two major grounds for
withdrawal of citizenship in 2009 amendments to the citizenship law,
namely the failure to declare the acquisition of foreign citizenship and
failure to serve in the military. This left three grounds for the with-
drawal of citizenship, all of which are treason or disloyalty related and
require the person to be an external citizen in the first place (Art. 29).
Former citizens who lose their Turkish citizenship can re-acquire after
three years of residence if they do not constitute a threat to national
security. A more serious form of withdrawal, which did not allow for re-
acquisition, was introduced in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup
through two amendments to the citizenship law (Art 25 (g) for the ci-
tizens by birth and Art 26 for citizens who acquired their citizenship
after birth). Very close in their formulations, these provisions allowed
the state to withdraw citizenship if the person had engaged in criminal
activities against the internal or external security and financial or
economic safety of the state while being abroad or went abroad hin-
dering the criminal investigation. In cases of state of emergency or of
war the duration could be reduced to one month. According to the
report of the Turkish parliament's commission on investigating military
coups, after the military coup of 12 September 1980, Turkey has made
generous use of this provision by retrieving the citizenship of 14,000
people while 30,000 people applied for asylum abroad, which included
activists, politicians, intellectuals and artists, whom were then involved
in different leftist political circles, Alevi and Kurdish associations
abroad.5 Whereas Art. 26 was repealed in 2009, Art. 25 (g) was already
removed with a 1992 amendment that also opened possibilities of re-
acquisition of citizenship as well as reinstatement of the confiscated
property.
Removing these provisions did not mean that those former citizens
who lost their citizenship soon after 1981, were automatically granted
citizenship, however in line with its increasing positive engagement
with its external citizens, AKP government has encouraged them to
return to Turkey. In a rally hold in Düsseldorf in 2011, Erdoğan himself
uttered these words:
“We invite our artists and writers who had to migrate to Europe
because of the obstacles before freedom of expression back to their
country. We invite our artists to participate in and contribute to the
transformation that Turkey is undergoing. I would like to remind
them the door is wide open to them”.6
These statements were also echoed by the then Vice President Bekir
Bozdağ who announced that as a government they were ready to grant
citizenship to the thousands of people who had unfairly lost their citi-
zenship if they were to apply. He reclaimed “These are our people. Our
door is open”.7
Now, 25 years after the removal of such a withdrawal ground and
almost 40 years after its intensive application, the Turkish state re-
introduced a similar withdrawal clause in January 2017 with the gov-
ernmental decree (KHK 680) that amended the Art 29 of the Turkish
citizenship law. This decree is one of many rounds of decrees issued
during two-year long state of emergency announced soon after the 2016
failed coup attempt. The Decree no. 680 provides for the withdrawal of
citizenship of individuals who are under investigation or prosecution
for “breaking the unity of the state and the integrity of the nation”, for
“violating the constitution”, for “armed attack and assassination of the
president”, for “crimes against the legislative body”, for “crimes against
the government,” for “armed rebellion against the government,” for
“membership in an armed terror organisation” or for “provision of
weapons to armed terrorist organisations” (Turkish Penal Code Articles
302, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315) if they do not respond to a call
to return to Turkey within three months. So far, two lists that include
the names of 130 people in June 2017 and of 99 people in September
2017 have been issued by the government. The lists include not sur-
prisingly the name of Fethullah Gülen, who is accused by the Turkish
state to have plotted the July 2016 coup attempt. However, the list also
includes pro-Kurdish and left-wing People's Democratic Party (HDP)
deputies. At first glance, this form of negative engagement with ex-
ternal citizens, even though not unprecedented in Turkish history,
seems in sharp contrast with the acts of positive engagement that AKP
government has so far undertaken. However, in reality, this follows a
continuous line that is also followed on the institutional dimension,
manifested in the absence of contact with the Kurdish and Alevi dia-
sporic organisations.
Next to the withdrawal of citizenship, in the immediate aftermath of
the July 2016 coup attempt, AKP government also issued a widespread
ban on leaving the country for public sector personnel, including aca-
demics. Although the general ban is now lifted, Turkey still applies
discretionary power over its citizens' right to exit. The Decree no. 667 of
July 2016 provides for the cancellation of the passports of individuals
who are investigated or prosecuted for charges of membership or
connection to terrorist organisations or other groups that are a threat to
national security. Similarly, the Decree no. 673 in September 2017
provides for the cancelation of the passports of the spouses of people
whose passports are cancelled although it contradicts with Art. 30 of
the citizenship law which postulates that citizenship withdrawals are
personal and do not apply to the children and spouses. This decree
certainly casts doubt on the individuality of the citizenship bond and, as
it is often used to ‘retaliate’ the person who is sought after, emerges as a
very close account to the Moss and Michaelsen's (2017) notes on Syria
and Iran and an example of what Dalmasso et al. (2017) calls the “whim
of the regime.” One widely-known case is Can Dündar, a Turkish
journalist who was arrested on charges of being a member of a terror
organisation, espionage and revealing confidential documents. Shortly
after his release from detention, he fled to Germany and later got
sentenced to five years in prison for revealing state secrets. He is one of
the many for whom Turkey issued an arrest warrant in his name and
requested extradition from Germany.8 While he has ‘officially’ become
an external citizen, in order to force him to return his wife's passport
has been cancelled. The situation is however far beyond the ‘famous’
cases. The government itself announced in December 2017 that
234,419 passports were cancelled in the fight against FETO, which
5 Full report in Turkish can be found here: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/
sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss376_Cilt2.pdf (accessed 07.03.2018).
6 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/511319/Tayyip_Erdogan_in_
12_Eylul_ozlemi.html# (accessed 07.03.2018).
7 http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/evrenin-hainlerine-anavatan-kucak-acti/
haber-228318 (accessed 06.03.2018).
8 Since July 2016, Turkey is reported to request the arrest of over 800 citizens
from Germany. https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiyeden-almanyaya-yüzlerce-
yakalama-talebi/a-45551231 (accessed 25.09.2018).
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includes a wide range of civil servants, from teachers and academics to
law enforcement.9
Again, this is not extremely unusual in Turkish politics, after the
1980 coup, 388,000 persons were denied a passport. 10 What makes the
current practice remarkable is the sharp contrast of such legal exclusion
with the measures introduced over the last decade that broadened the
limits of the political membership and rendered institutional expansion
selectively inclusive. On the other hand, it equally, if not more, con-
tributes to shifting the locus of popular sovereignty from territoriality to
loyalty to incumbent government since external citizens can enjoy right
to vote only in the absence of a threat of loss of citizenship.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper aimed to contribute to the emerging literature on the
growing trend of states' diasporic engagements and the adjacent studies
on the extra-territorial power of authoritarian states through the case
study of Turkey. Pinpointing the limitations of focusing on negative-
only or positive-only diaspora engagements, we argued that state-dia-
spora relations are better conceptualised through a citizenship lens that
allows tracing parallel processes to citizens at home and abroad. At the
genesis of this conceptual argument is the empirical observation of the
misfit of the Turkish case, which, according to the elaborate classifi-
cations developed in the literature, is (mis)placed at the inclusive end of
the spectrum (Palop-Garcia and Pedroza 2017; Ragazzi, 2014). This left
us with a puzzle to explain; a puzzle that displays contradicting state
policies: simultaneously a policy that includes external citizens at dif-
ferent degrees by broadening the limits of political membership
through enfranchisement and designing new institutions appealing to
the ‘de-territorialised nation’; exclude some external as well as internal
citizens along the lines of loyalty to the ruling political party, and thus
decrease the territorially determined distinction between internal and
external citizens. Here we suggest that the puzzle could be solved by
considering the diasporic engagement practices that simultaneously
occur on different dimensions, namely institutional, political and legal
with a citizenship lens. Such a lens allows us to capture the scope of
inclusive or exclusiveness of diasporic policies in each dimension and
place them within the larger processes of broadening political mem-
bership and shifting limits of popular sovereignty.
Our analysis of the evolution of Turkey's diasporic policies on in-
stitutional, political and legal dimensions shows that there has been a
shift from indifference to engagement but also clear continuity in terms
of institutional engagement as in selectively engaging with like-minded
constituencies, only with a stronger ethno-religious undertone. On the
political dimension, against the background of the rising suspicion
against the external as well as internal citizens with the 2016 failed
coup attempt and the ensuing state of emergency, the strategy of the
incumbent AKP party/state has been to increase the number of voting
stations abroad during the elections marathon of the last years and at
the same time reach out the external potential AKP voter base through
available state and non-state channels even by breaching diplomatic
manners.11 While enjoying the right to vote seems to bring external and
internal citizens on equal footing on the political dimension –with all
the limitations that come with unfair elections in a competitive au-
thoritarian regime-it also nurtured a new dividing line that crosscuts
internal and external citizens alike based on loyalty to the AKP's poli-
tical regime. This new demarcation line that re-defines political mem-
bership on the basis of party loyalty and expands the symbolic source of
sovereignty beyond the territorial borders of the state was further
exacerbated by the recent decrees that suspend the right to mobility of
some citizens. Even though the decrees allowing such legal exclusion
were enacted during the two-year state of emergency that ended in July
2018 and could therefore be seen as the products of these exceptional
times, there is no plausible reason to believe that the current author-
itarian regime sealed with April 2017 constitutional change will move
in the direction of expanding citizenship rights for all. It should also be
remembered that such curtailment of citizenship rights for the pro-
claimed ‘enemies of the state’ (e.g. ethno-religious minorities, Kurds
and leftists) is no exception in Turkish politics. What is new now is the
co-occurrence of expansion on political dimension along with curtail-
ment of rights on legal dimension.
The dynamic citizenship lens, which requires to have a holistic look
at institutional, political and legal dimensions of inclusion and exclu-
sion at home and abroad, questions not only the inside-outside di-
chotomy, but also the very existence of a static “inside” that would
expand beyond the territorial borders. Recent studies hint at the dif-
ferences between state and party outreach to populations abroad
(Burgess, 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei, forthcoming) which begs
further investigation of the implications of such a divergence for the
notions of political membership and popular sovereignty. A dynamic
citizenship lens might be particularly useful to study this state-party
relationship, especially in authoritarian settings, like Turkey with long
years of uninterrupted single party rule, but the idea of a ‘unitary
sending state’ is increasingly problematised in different contexts (see
Koinova & Tsourapas, 2018). As noted earlier, recent measures in-
troduced as part of ‘the war on terror’ in Western states demonstrate
that such a holistic approach that analyses legal, political and institu-
tional dimensions in its own right could be useful to detect mechanisms
cutting across political regimes and actors.
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